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should benefit asset-poor borrowers in particular. Yet, empirically this is not always 
true. For example, most of the new monitored finance from contract farming firms and 
agro-industry traders during Chile’s recent agricultural boom went to medium and large 
commercial farmers and traditional forms of monitored finance for collateral poor 
farmers from informal trader-moneylenders actually may have declined. Based on 
interviews and historical accounts of this market and the analysis of a theoretical model, 
this paper argues that lenders may have been forced to reduce tied-credit to small 
farmers in several crops because increased product market competition exacerbated the 
problem of "pirates sales'' or post-harvest opportunistic default. This further restricted 
the already narrow set of enforceable property claims upon which monitored credit 
contracts to solve ex-ante moral hazard contracting problems could have been fashioned. 
This problem was avoided in crops where product markets are more concentrated and in 
export activities where crop liens are easier to establish with better capitalized farmers. 
The model points to an important connection between the nature of market competition 
and the depth of lending relationships that appears to be important in many other 
contexts. 
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 1 Introduction
Recent models of ﬁnancial intermediation have emphasized that when markets are
incomplete a ﬁrm’s liquid asset holdings may be an important determinant of the
ﬁrm’s access to bank loans versus more direct forms of ﬁnance such as bonds (Freixas
and Rochet, 1999). While these models successfully account for important stylized
facts in the pattern of ﬁnancial contracting according to borrowers’ asset class, they
have only just begun to explain important variations in ﬁnancial organization across
countries or across sectors within a country. Why for example has monitored lending
p l a y e dam o r ed o m i n a n tr o l ei nc o u n t r i e ssuch as Japan and Germany compared to
other large industrial countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom at
similar levels of income per capita? Why are the terms of bank loans to small business
borrowers so often sector-speciﬁc rather than simply adjusted to characteristics of
the borrower and their asset holdings? Does increased credit and product market
competition improve or harm small business access to credit markets?
Chilean agriculture oﬀers a rich set of recent experiences within which to study
the rise of intermediaries, the development of new ﬁnancial markets and contractual
forms and their impact on economic growth and equity. The aim of this paper is
to examine salient aspects of the development of this market so as to shine some
insight on some of these broader questions. The discussion is built around a model
that explores the optimal menu of contracts that emerges from analyzing the interac-
tion of two ﬁnancial contracting problems that are usually treated separately: (1) an
1analysis of the problem of ex-post moral hazard and the use of termination threats
as analyzed for instance by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and (2) an analysis of the
problem of ex-ante moral hazard in the use of borrowed funds and the role of collat-
eral and monitoring by intermediaries in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
and Conning (1999).
The analysis is inspired by a case study of the market for rural ﬁnance in Chile
conducted by the author in the mid-nineties. Spurred by far reaching economic
liberalization and an agricultural export boom, the Chilean countryside experienced
greatly increased product market competition and the rise of many new ﬁnancial
intermediaries and contract forms. Heavily monitored production ﬁnance oﬀered
by exporting ﬁrms and agroindustrial companies via contract farming arrangements
became a dominant form of production ﬁnance during this period.1,2 These ﬁrms
operate today in much the same way as more informal trader-moneylenders have
1Like trade credit in other sectors, this type of ﬁnance is ’informal ﬁnance’ in the sense
that Chile’s ﬁnancial oversight authorities do not directly supervise or measure its ﬂow.
CEPAL (1992) estimates that in 1990 approximately 40,000 Chilean farmers received ﬁnance
from contract farming operations compared to less than 30,000 who borrowed from banks
(there are an estimated 250,000 farm enterprises in Chile). Marchant (1995) employs several
diﬀerent indirect measures to conclude that after retained earnings, trader ﬁnance provides
the largest source of ﬁnance for Chilean agriculture. He also ﬁnds that this share has been
rising steadily relative to bank ﬁnance.
2Throughout this paper, I will label bank loans as relatively uninformed (not-monitored)
forms of ﬁnance, while loans from traders, contract farming ﬁrms, and informal moneylen-
ders will be monitored loans. This is in contrast to the labeling adopted by most of the
literature on monitored ﬁnance (e.g. Diamond (1984), Hoshi et al (1992), and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997)), which considers banks as providing monitored loans. While bank loan
oﬃcers in Chile do sometimes visit farm borrowers these visits usually occur prior to loan
approval and appear to be aimed largely at appraising the value of collateral assets and
not to monitoring the project during execution. Loans are heavily collateralized and are
available mainly only to medium and larger farmers.
2operated in Chile and elsewhere in the world since time immemorial: by advancing
credit to farmers early in the growing season in exchange for claims to all or part of
the crop at harvest.
The explosive overall expansion of monitored ﬁnance masks, however, important
variations in the ﬁnancing options available from crop to crop and to diﬀerent strata
of farmers. The pattern of access in fact poses a serious puzzle to existing models
of monitored lending and interlinked transactions, which typically predict that mon-
itored and interlinked contracts act as collateral substitutes and therefore should be
particularly advantageous in improving credit access for small farmers. The puzzle,
however, is that in fact most new monitored ﬁnance has gone to better capitalized
medium and larger commercial farmers in the export sector (mainly fresh fruit ex-
ports). The available historical evidence suggests furthermore that tied credit for
small farmers from more traditional informal trader-moneylenders actually became
less prevalent in certain crops at the same time that interlinked contracting boomed
for other sectors and better capitalized farmers.3 There are, however, hopeful and
illuminating exceptions to what otherwise might appear to be a generalized pattern
of exclusion. Monitored ﬁnance for small farmers is, for example, common in crops
such as sugar beet, tobacco, and tomatoes for agroindustry.
What then determines whether ﬁnancial intermediaries are willing to oﬀer inter-
3Cox (1990), Carter and Mesbah (1993), Echeñique (1993), Korovkin (1992) and Or-
tega (1992) all describe the early stages of the Chilean agro export boom as a period of
‘exclusionary’ growth.
3linked and/or monitored ﬁnance to small farmers in diﬀe r e n tc r o p s ?M a r k e tp a r t i c -
ipants were fairly quick to explain the problem in their own words. Product market
traders said they were reluctant to oﬀer tied and monitored credit to small farmers
in certain crops because of their fear of “pirates sales” or post-harvest opportunistic
default. Pirate sales occur when farmers surreptitiously sell produce on the market
which they might previously have pledged to a trader-lender. In many traditional
small farmer crops (e.g. wheat, maize and beans) a large number of product market
buyers makes the potential problem of pirate sales so severe that monitored credit
from traders has in fact completely dissappeared. Farmers in these crops have few
ﬁnancing opportunities other than collateral-based (bank) loans, which are normally
not accessible, or use of retained earnings or informal ﬁnance from family and friends.
In stark contrast to this situation are the cases of crops with a single monopsony
buyer where the problem pirate sales is not an issue at all. Crop pledges are self-
enforcing in these crops, leaving the product buyer, with plenty of room to design
innovative tied and monitored credit arrangements for small farmers. In Chile this is
the case for example with sugar beet and tobacco, where buyers ﬁnance eighty percent
and more of farmer’s production ﬁnance needs.4 An intermediate situation occurs in
crops such as rice or horticultural products for the city market, where the product
market is more oligopsonic. In these markets a primary role of the intermediary
4In the case study district of San Clemente (Province of Talca), Chile the sugar beet
company IANSA often ﬁnances more than 100 percent of some small farmers’ sugar beet
production needs. A ’second credit account’ is made available which small farmers often
use to buy farm machinery and inputs for other crops.
4monitoring agents is to police pirate sales, as the following account makes clear:
During his visits the company agent endeavors to discover with discretion
if the cultivator is selling his production to other ﬁrms or intermediaries
in violation of the contract arrangement. This is necessary because of the
widespread and, apparently, increasing phenomenon of “pirating”... Seri-
ous and frequent examples of pirating occur especially at the beginning of
the harvest season. In this period between January and February many
truckers circulate in the countryside oﬀering farmers cash payment for a
part of farmers’ production. In this way the pirates sell early-season pro-
duce in the Santiago market, and quite likely also to other agroindustries...
The ﬁrm’s response strategy is based fundamentally on preventive control
and the threat of terminating any form of ﬁnancial, technical or commer-
cial cooperation with the farmer... Di Girolamo (1991; pp.236-237).
The remaining sections of the paper aim to formalize and document these ideas.
After a short description of the market for rural ﬁnance in the case study area and dis-
cussion of some of the actual methods of monitored lending, the theoretical analysis
of the problem of moral hazard in the use of borrowed funds is carried out under the
assumption that project outcomes are fully veriﬁable (i.e., crop pledges can be cost-
lessly enforced). This section explains the role of non-crop collateral and monitoring
as a collateral substitute.
The problem of ex-post moral hazard is then introduced. In contrast to other
approaches, which have assumed that non-veriﬁable proﬁts are diverted dollar for
dollar by the borrower, the analysis assumes that diverted produce may sell at a
discount outside the contract. The size of this discount will depend on the number of
potential product buyers in the market and on the cost of legal enforcement. A menu
of optimal contracts with diﬀerent collateral requirements and monitoring intensities
5is derived that determines a pattern of credit access across borrowers.5 More com-
petitive product markets and/or more lax legal enforcement signal a higher price for
diverted output and hence an increase in the requirement of non-crop collateral to
make crop pledges self-enforcing. But this in turn makes more diﬃcult any eﬀorts
to broaden access to small farmers by using monitoring as a collateral substitute to
address the problem of ex-ante moral hazard. Hence monitored lending is less likely
encountered in sectors with stiﬀe rp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o n .
The model is extended to a multi-period setting in which contingent renewal
threats are shown to help reduce the collateral requirements that restricted small
farmer access in the static case. The essential tradeoﬀ between the two types of
contracting problems persists, however, and the credit market therefore remains frag-
mented. The ﬁnal sections of the paper provide more detailed description of the
Chilean case study and conclude with some lessons that might be applied to other
contexts.
2 Crop and non-crop Collateral and Monitoring
It will be important to distinguish between crop- and non-crop collateral. When “the
crop itself” is said to be serving as collateral, the lender usually has been able to
5Other analyses of ex-post moral hazard have ignored the role of non-crop collateral and
focused instead on costly audit technologies (Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985))
or termination threats (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) to provide incentives to compel
borrowers to repay lenders. The role of each of these additional mechanisms is discussed
below.
6establish a property claim over all or a part of the farmer’s eventual harvest. In the
language of agricultural ﬁnance, the lender is assumed to have been able to establish a
crop lien. A crop lien gives the lender legal control rights over the use and destination
of the farmer’s harvest even while it does not necessarily confer actual possession of
the crop. An enforceable crop lien can be as eﬀective as actual possession, however,
because it allows the lender to hold the farmer’s crop hostage: the farmer himself, or
perhaps another crop buyer, will in general be willing to pay up to the full market
value of the crop as ransom to the lender in order to have the lien released.
Many agricultural lenders will insist upon non-crop collateral guarantees in addi-
tion to a crop lien. For example, bank loan oﬃcers typically insist upon obtaining
land mortgage or chattel mortgage over animals, farm machinery, or other forms of
property. Lenders may insist upon non-crop collateral because they do not trust the
lien, or do not value it very highly. They might fear that the farmer will be able to
conceal or divert part of the harvest. But even when they can establish a perfect
crop lien lenders may insist on additional guarantees because of the problem of moral
hazard in the use of borrowed funds (or because of adverse selection, although this
seems less likely in a rural setting).
The problem of moral hazard arises because the expected value of a crop harvest
(and hence the expected value of a lender’s property claims over project outcomes)
may depend on the unobserved level of diligence with which a farmer executes the
p r o j e c t .T op r o v i d ei n c e n t i v e sf o rt h eb o r r o w e rt ob es u ﬃciently diligent, lenders may
7demand the guarantee of non-crop collateral to guarantee repayment in the event of
low harvest returns.
In comparison to other ﬁnancial intermediaries in most developing countries,
banks are very poorly informed lenders. This is particularly so in the context of
rural lending. Bank oﬃces are typically in large towns or county capitals. Loan
oﬃcers only occasionally venture into the rural areas where agricultural production
actually takes place. The problem of moral hazard is a serious one for these lenders,
and for this reason banks typically insist on establishing not only legal crop liens but
substantial non-crop guarantees such as land or chattel mortgages.
Loans provided by trader-lenders and contract farming ﬁrms6 on the other hand
typically involve far less collateral per dollar borrowed than bank loans, and at times
no collateral pledge other than the crop itself. This is because their loans are usually
very heavily monitored during the course of growing season and prior to repayment.
Contract farming ﬁrms, for example, typically advance credit in installments carefully
timed to match the farmer’s likely needs in diﬀerent tasks throughout the crop season.
The release of an installment may be held up or sized down in response to a farmer’s
actions up to that date as perceived by the company extension agent. A signiﬁcant
fraction of the loans are in-kind: seed, fertilizer, or a voucher for transport services
will be delivered to the farmer rather than cash, and agents will often visit the farmer
6Except where I wish to draw a distinction, in the rest of the paper I will often use the
single term trader-lender to refer to a lender who operates as do contract farming ﬁrms and
more traditional informal trader-lenders who provide credit advances in exchange for a crop
pledge.
8during the time when this fertilizer or other inputs are being applied. While this is
ostensibly to provide technical assistance, many contract farming ﬁrms readily admit
that these procedures are also designed to insure that inputs and cash advances are
not diverted to other crops or private uses that might beneﬁt the farmer but over
which the company cannot establish legal claim.
Such monitoring and control activities have proven to be quite successful at ame-
liorating the problem of moral hazard in the use of borrowed funds. But they are
also costly. Monitored lending is in general an expensive form of lending compared to
collateral enforcement. To recover the cost of such monitoring and extension activ-
ities, lenders typically either explicitly quote higher interest rates in their contracts
or raise interest rates implicitly via the price at which tied inputs are sold or farm
p r o d u c ei sb o u g h t .
3T h e M o d e l
Consider a rural economy with a large number of farmer-entrepreneurs. Each entre-
preneur has access to a crop production technology requiring a lump sum investment
of I . For simplicity, consider projects with only two possible crop outcomes. Either
the crop is a success xs, or a failure, in which case it is valued at xf <x s. The entrepre-
neur is assumed to choose between two possible levels of diligence on the project (or
equivalently, between two production techniques) which aﬀect the expected return.
The borrower’s level of diligence might refer, for example, to the quantity and quality
9of seed and fertilizer inputs actually applied to the project, and/or the farmer’s labor
eﬀort. When the farmer chooses to be fully diligent, the project succeeds with proba-
bility π and fails with probability (1−π) for an expected project return of E(x|π)=
πxs+( 1−π)xf. On the other hand, when the entrepreneur is not diligent the project
succeeds with probability π < π, for a lower expected crop harvest of E(x|π). For the
moment it is assumed that crop liens can be perfectly and costlessly enforced or, in
other words, that project returns xi are costlessly veriﬁable.
Although non-diligence in production lowers the expected harvest return, it may
also allow the entrepreneur to divert eﬀort or funds away from the ﬁnanced project
toward other uses that generate private beneﬁts. If the borrower’s level of diligence
is not observable to the lender, a potential problem of moral hazard emerges. The
problem is that, depending on the terms of the ﬁnancial contract, the entrepreneur
may not bear the full negative consequence of non-diligence in terms of lowered ex-
pected project returns because part of these may be passed onto the lender. On the
other hand, the borrower can capture the full value of the private beneﬁtf r o mn o n -
diligence. Assume that there is no private beneﬁt when the borrower is diligent, and
that the private beneﬁt under non-diligence B(c) can be inﬂuenced by c ≥ 0, the level
of resources that an intermediary has spent on monitoring and control activities. For
example, a lender’s frequent visits to the farmer’s ﬁeld or the delivery of loans in kind
in the form of fertilizer or seed lowers the borrower’s scope for diverting funds and
resources to other uses. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the costly monitoring
10activity will itself be subject to moral hazard when carried out by a delegate monitor
or intermediary on behalf of an uninformed outside lender.
The function B(c) indicates how the borrower’s opportunity cost of being diligent
can be modiﬁed by the lender’s monitoring activities. It is reasonable to assume that
there are diminishing returns to the monitoring activity:
Assumption 1: The borrower’s private beneﬁt from choosing the low action B(c)
satisﬁes Bc < 0 and Bcc > 0.
Assume that investment funds I not used in production or lending could earn a
gross return γI if left in a bank deposit. Entrepreneurs are assumed to be identical
in all respects except for their initial holding of collateral wealth, indicated by their
second-period value A. These are by deﬁnition liquid assets or assets whose value is
relatively easy to establish and to transfer to an outside investor. A could represent
assets such as the entrepreneur’s land, home, or equipment — assets which are perhaps
in use in the ﬁrst period but which could easily be liquidated in the second period
if needed. So long as the return from keeping these assets in other uses exceeds the
entrepreneur’s cost of funds, even an entrepreneur with a very large collateral asset
holding A may decide to borrow funds I from the market.
113.1 Exogenously enforced Crop Liens
There are two types of lender on the market: uninformed lenders such as banks
who rely primarily on collateral based enforcement of their loans, and monitoring
lenders who lend against less collateral per peso borrowed than do banks, but who
must actively monitor their borrowers during the course of the growing season. The
analysis will later distinguish between two types of monitoring lenders: intermediary
lenders, who lend to farmers out out of their own equity and from funds leveraged
from outside lenders, and pure moneylenders, who lend entirely out of their own
equity. Let Im ≥ 0 be the ﬁnance provided to a borrower out of the monitoring
lender’s own equity, and Iu ≥ 0, the remaining contribution from the un-informed
bank lender. We must have I = Im + Iu for a project to be fully ﬁnanced.
When crop liens are assumed to be costlessly enforced, the contract design problem
is to choose how to divide optimally the available property claims generated by each
veriﬁable harvest outcome xi between a return to the borrower si, a return to the
monitoring intermediary wi and a return to an uninformed lender Ri = xi − si −
wi. This division must be chosen in a way such that both the borrower and the
intermediary monitor have incentives to take their unobserved action choices, and
in a way such that all parties are willing to participate. The sequence of events
is as follows. First, the parties agree to the terms of a contract and the lenders
deliver their loan amounts (Im and/or Iu) to the borrower. At the start of the
production cycle, the monitor commits to a monitoring strategy c. In response to
12these conditions, the farm borrower chooses his unobserved production diligence level
π or π. Production uncertainty is resolved at harvest, and property claims over the
realized project outcome are divided according to the terms of the contract. Assuming
a competitive lending market with free entry into both the uninformed and monitored
lending activities, an optimal contract {si,w i,R i} for a borrower with collateral assets
A is found by solving the following program:
max
wi ,s i,cE(si|π)
E(Ri|π) ≥ γIu (1)
E(wi|π) − c ≥ γIm (2)
E(si|π) ≥ E(si|π)+B(c) (3)
E(wi|π) − c ≥ E(wi|π) (4)
si ≥− Ai =1 ,2 (5)
Im + Iu = I, Im ≥ 0,I u ≥ 0,
Constraint (1) is the bank lender’s participation constraint. It requires that she
earn at least as much from expected repayments as she could earn from leaving
t h es a m ei n v e s t m e n tf u n d sIu in the competitive interest rate on competitive bank
deposits summarized in the gross return γ. Similarly, (2) is the intermediary’s par-
ticipation constraint, which requires that the expected value of repayments wi to an
intermediary who lends amount Im and monitors at cost c be at least as large as what
she could have earned from a similar bank deposit. The borrower’s incentive compati-
bility constraint (3) requires that the borrower earn at least as much from choosing the
high action than from the ineﬃcient low action. Noting that E(si|π)=πss+(1−π)sf.
13Writing this constraint out and rearranging leads to the more compact:
ss − sf ≥
B(c)
∆π
where ∆π =( π − π). This expression tells us that an incentive compatible loan
contract requires that the borrower earn suﬃciently more from a successful outcome
than from a failure to have the incentive to want to raise the probability of success
by choosing higher actions. On the other hand, the borrower’s limited liability con-
straints (5) state that total repayments from the borrower to the lenders following
any given project outcome xi cannot exceed the value of that outcome plus all of the
borrower’s available collateral assets A,s oRi+wi ≤ xi+A. Inequality (5) is obtained
by substituting the relation Ri + wi = xi − si into this last inequality.
Four possible lending regimes emerge as solutions to the optimization problem.
Which loan contract type and monitoring intensity is optimal or best matched to
a particular type of borrower will depend on the level of collateral assets A that
borrower has to oﬀer:





− E(x|π)+γI + c (6)
and deﬁne the cutoﬀ level c from the relation π
Bc(c)
∆π = −1 and let b c =
γI
π .T h e
Optimum Monitoring Intensity c(A) for a borrower with assets A is deﬁned implicitly
by A(c)=A over the domain (0,c). Borrowers will be matched to diﬀerent loan types
14according to their initial level of collateral assets as follows:
Loan Type Collateral Assets Loan Amounts
Non-monitored Loans
(e.g. Banks) A ≥ A(0) (Iu = I,I m =0 )
Intermediated Monitored Loans
(e.g. contract farming ﬁrms) A(0) >A≥ A(b c)( Iu > 0,I m > 0)
Directly Monitored Loans
(e.g. traditional moneylender traders) A(b c) >A≥ A(c)( Iu =0,I m = I)
Excluded from loan market
(self-ﬁnance or abandon production) A(c) >A (Iu =0,I m =0 )
where Imis the loan required from the monitoring intermediary and is given by γIm =
π
c(A)
∆π −c(A) over the asset range A ∈ [A(c),A(0)) a n dz e r oo t h e r w i s e ,a n dIm+Iu = I.
The proposition can be understood as follows. Consider ﬁrst the contract oﬀered
by an uninformed lender, such as a bank, without the presence of an additional
intermediary lender. Since there is no intermediary involved, we can drop constraints
(2) and (4) and set wf = ws = c =0 . From the incentive compatibility constraint
(3) and the borrower’s (implicit) participation constraint, it is clear that if collateral
is to be required at all, it will be in the failure state. It is also evident that when
collateral use is at a minimum, the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (3)
must bind because this makes the failure repayment level Rf = xf − sf as low as
feasible (and when sf i sa sl a r g ea sf e a s i b l ec o l l a t e r a li sa tam i n i m u m ) .T h eb i n d i n g





∆π . This last expression is the minimum expected return — or the
enforcement rent — that must be left to the borrower if the incentive compatibility
15constraint is to bind. Substituting this into the investor’s break-even condition yields:




The lowest repayment Rf = xf −sf such that the above constraint holds exactly and





This is the minimum collateral requirement. No bank would be willing to lend to
a borrower who could not post at least A(0) collateral, because the bank could not
trust such a borrower to have a suﬃcient incentive not to pursue private beneﬁts that
harm the value of expected repayments. The proposition thus states that borrow-
ers with assets A ≥ A(0) will have access to loans that require minimum collateral
requirements of exactly A(0)and will earn E(si|π)=−A(0) + π
B(0)
∆π = E(x|π) − γI
in expected value – the expected project outcome net of the minimum expected
repayments required for the investor to participate. The cost of funds to the bor-
rower who borrows from a bank is therefore exactly the bank’s opportunity cost of
funds, or the lowest market rate. Borrowers with insuﬃcient assets A to meet these
requirements will be excluded from pure-collateral based loans but may still be able
to obtain ﬁnance through more expensive monitored loans.
Under the free entry assumption intermediary proﬁts are driven to zero, so the
16intermediary’s break-even constraint should hold as an equality. Any contract of
the form wf,w s = wf + c
∆π will satisfy the intermediary’s monitoring incentive
compatibility constraint (4). Consider the case where the intermediary’s liability
in the borrower’s project is limited to the amount of intermediary capital put at
risk, or that wf = −γIm. Substituting into the intermediary’s binding participation
constraint (2) and rearranging in a similar fashion to what was done to obtain (7)







The monitoring intermediary lender return is thus −γIm − c = −π c
∆π when the
project fails (i.e., she loses the full opportunity value of her investment plus the mon-
itoring expense c),a n d c
∆π − γIm − c =( 1− π) c
∆π when the project succeeds, for an
expected return that is just enough to cover the monitoring expense and opportunity
cost of funds. By lending Im the intermediary establishes a stake in the borrower’s
project that provides her with the incentive to monitor making the uninformed lender
willing to step in and make the remaining investment Iu = I−Im. This is the sense in
which the monitoring lender is also an intermediary: she facilitates or intermediates
funding from other less informed sources. To solve for the minimum collateral require-
ment when there is a monitoring intermediary is straightforward. Simply substitute
(8) and E(si|π)=sf +
B(c)
∆π (from the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint)
17into the investor’s participation constraint (1), and rearrange terms as before to obtain
the minimum collateral requirement A(c) in 6. The minimum collateral requirement
on an uninformed loan in (7) appears therefore as just a special case of this more
general collateral hurdle with monitoring intensity set at zero.
Whether monitoring actually lowers the minimum collateral requirement on a loan
depends on the nature the monitoring technology. There are two eﬀects. On the one
hand, monitoring lowers the borrower’s private beneﬁts from side activities. This
relaxes the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint and hence the enforcement
rent that must be left with the borrower by π
Bc(c)
∆π , lowering the collateral requirement.
Monitoring is a costly activity, however, and every extra dollar’s worth of monitoring
reduces the expected total project surplus from which repayments can be made by
one dollar. This second eﬀect raises the collateral requirement. If π
Bc(0)
∆π > −1 then
the ﬁrst dollar spent on monitoring will have the net eﬀect of lowering the collateral
hurdle. Because of the assumption of diminishing returns to monitoring (Bcc > 0),
h o w e v e r ,t h e r ei ss o m em o n i t o r i n gi n t e n s i t yl e v e lc at which π
Bc(c)
∆π = −1. Beyond
c no further monitoring is worthwhile, as the marginal beneﬁt of an extra dollar of
monitoring always exceeds its marginal cost. Figure 1 illustrates how the minimum
collateral requirement might fall over the range (0,c) and rise thereafter.
Figure 1 about here
Corollary 2 Collateral poor borrowers obtain a larger proportion of their ﬁnance via
monitored lending arrangements and pay a higher implicit interest rate.
Since monitoring uses real resources, monitored lending is always more expensive
18than uninformed lending. It follows that only collateral-poor borrowers with assets
below the bank collateral requirement A(0) would turn to monitored ﬁnance. To
economize on the cost of borrowing, borrowers will choose loans with the minimum
monitoring required to satisfy incentives and lower the collateral requirement to their
available asset level A. The optimal level of monitoring is therefore that level at which
A(c)=A, or c(A)=A
−1(A). The expected return to a monitored borrower is easily
calculated to be E(si|π)=E(x|π)−γI−c(A), where c(A) is the optimum monitoring
intensity. Since the borrower repays γI + c(A) on I borrowed, the implicit interest
rate per dollar borrowed on a loan of size I is γ +
c(A)
I w h i c hi sd e c r e a s i n gi nt h e
borrower’s collateral wealth A.
Poorer borrowers also use a larger proportion of monitored lending Im in their
total ﬁnancing package since by (8), γIm = π
c(A)
∆π −c(A) is non-decreasing in c(A) and
therefore non-increasing in A. The diﬀerence between two types of monitored lending
emerges. As we move to borrowers with fewer and fewer collateral assets, monitoring
intensity will rise until it has reached a point b c deﬁned by γIm = π b c
∆π − b c = γI.
At this point so much monitoring is required that the intermediary’s stake in the
borrower’s project Im equals the full investment I. As A is further decreased, mon-
itoring intensity eventually reaches level c, beyond which further monitoring simply
becomes unproﬁtable. This deﬁnes an absolute minimum collateral requirement A(c),
below which borrowers will be excluded entirely from the loan market. The monitor-
ing lender will be lending I entirely out of her own equity for borrowers with assets
19between A(c) and A(b c). Studies of rural credit markets have characterized infor-
mal moneylenders precisely in the terms predicted by the model: moneylenders lend
primarily out of own equity, they monitor and screen borrowers intensely, and they
charge high interest rates (Aleem, 1994; Bell, 1994).7
3.2 Imperfect Crop Liens
One type of farmer who ﬁnds it diﬃcult to borrow from non-resident
traders is the cassava grower, for the simple reason that cassava, un-
like other crops, can be harvested at any time between four and fourteen
months after planting. Without a ﬁxed harvest period, the enforcement
problem becomes very diﬃcult. Siamwalla et al. (1990; p. 282).
The last section assumed that lenders are able to seize whatever portion of the
farmer’s harvest is needed to secure a contractually agreed upon repayment level. The
crop itself was assumed to serve as partial collateral for the loan. The analysis then
turned on how much additional non-crop collateral was required to solve the problem
of ex-ante moral hazard in the use of borrowed funds. The lender was assumed to
have been able to establish and enforce a perfect crop lien over the borrower’s harvest.
This section extends the model to situations where perfect crop liens cannot be
established because of the diﬃculties involved in verifying actual harvest outcomes.
It is convenient to now think of the contract as involving two terms: (1) a price
at which the trader-lender agrees to purchase the farmer’s delivered crop (without
loss of generality normalized to unity), and (2) a loan repayment level Ri which is
7It has been assumed that the borrower’s own participation constraint does not bind
before monitoring level c is reached. If the farmer’s has a reservation utility given by K,
then his binding participation constraint E(si|π)=E(xi|π) − γI − c = K deﬁnes a cutoﬀ
level ck = E(xi|π) − γI − K. It has been assumed therefore that c ≤ ck.
20contingent, not on the actual harvest outcome as before, but on the size of the harvest
that the borrower reports and delivers to the lender. Lenders and outside enforcement
authorities can only verify that the project’s outcome did not fall below the lowest
failure outcome xf. They can compel the borrower to pay up to that amount, but
cannot verify or force repayments from outcomes above this size.
Farm borrowers are tempted to under-report successful harvests for two reasons.
First, this may allow them to get away with a lower loan repayment in the success
state. The lender, and the courts, will have diﬃculty establishing whether a borrower
who reports a low harvest outcome is opportunistically pretending to be unable to
repay, or whether the project did in fact fail despite the borrower’s best intentions
(in which case he may truly be unable to repay and forgiveness should be allowed).
A second related reason is that by under-reporting the producer may hope to earn
income from diverting the concealed harvest ∆x ≡ (xs −xf) to other proﬁtable uses.
He might, for example, secretly sell the non-reported produce to a “pirate” buyer or
divert the concealed harvest for home consumption. Assume that each unit of diverted
harvest earns an amount θ for the producer. Note that because of the possibility of
opportunistic loan default, it may be in a farmer’s best interest to divert produce
even when the price he can obtain for produce sold outside the contract is lower than
what he is paid within the contract; that is, even if θ < 1.
Parameter θ can be thought of as a measure of the state of development of the
legal and institutional mechanisms available for detecting and punishing contract
21non-compliance in the sector. One would expect θ to fall as the physical costs of
hiding and surreptitiously selling produce rise, and as the chances of being caught
and credibly punished increase. Under the extreme assumption that any diversion is
immediately detected and costlessly and eﬀectively punished, θ will equal zero.
A related interpretation, and the one stressed here, is that θ is a measure of
the extent of competition in the product market on which the trader and farmer
operate. When the market for produce is highly competitive, there will be many
potential “pirate buyers” and diverted produce will likely command a price θ that will
approximate the unitary contract price. Most analyses in the literature on costly state
veriﬁcation, beginning with Townsend (1979), have implicitly adopted this unitary
price assumption. In contrast, when produce markets are more highly concentrated,
there will be fewer potential illegal outlets for the harvest the farmer has pledged as
collateral and pirate sales will likely be easier to detect and punish.8 In the extreme
case of a single monopoly buyer, and where produce has no value in home consumption
(e.g. many industrial crops), there will be no place to divert produce and θ will be
zero.
The only relevant truth reporting constraint for the two outcome case at hand
requires that the borrower not under-report successful harvests.9 Given θ, when the
8The trader-lenders in a concentrated market are also more likely to arrive at cartel-
like arrangements to not pirate each other’s client’s harvests and possibly to segment their
operating territories. Basu and Bell (1992), Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (1997) and Floro and Ray
(1997) discuss models of monopolistic competition between trader-lenders with fragmented
territories.
9Technically we require two truth telling constraints: one to provide the farmer with
22borrower obtains a harvest xs, and he truthfully reports and delivers it to the trader,
his net return under the contract will be xs − Rs, the amount he earns from selling
xs units of harvest to the trader at the contract speciﬁed unitary price minus the
monetary repayment Rs due to the lender for that reported project outcome. If, on
the other hand, the farmer chooses to under-report a successful harvest outcome, his
total return will be xf −Rf +θ∆x,the amount xf −Rf the farmer earns from selling
xf to the trader net of the repayment Rf due for that reported outcome, plus θ∆x,
the peso amount the farmer earns from diverting ∆x ≡ (xs−xf) units to pirate sales
outside the contract. The truth reporting constraint can therefore be expressed as:
(xs − Rs) ≥ (xf − Rf)+θ(xs − xf) (9)
Using the relation ss = xs − Rs and sf = xf − Rf the constraint can be rearranged
into the more convenient compact form:
(ss − sf) ≥ θ∆x (10)
where ∆x =( xs − xf). The optimal ﬁnancial contract for a borrower with collateral
assets A is now given by the solution to the previously analyzed programming problem
(1) - (5) with the addition of the new constraint (10). The borrower may now be
incentive to truthfully report success states as stated in (9), and another to truthfully
report failure states. It is easily shown however that when the ﬁrst constraint is met this
second constraint automatically holds in the optimal program, so we need only focus on the
ﬁrst.
23tempted to augment his return by pursuing private beneﬁts B(c) and/or by diverting
a portion of his crop in the post-harvest repayment period.
Recall that the action incentive compatibility constraint (3) could be rewritten
as:




Which of these two constraints (10) or (11) binds ﬁrst will depend on the value of
the parameters and exogenous variables θ,x s,x f,∆π, as well as on the monitoring
technology captured in B(c). The optimal contract is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 When θ ≥
B(0)
∆x∆π (large θ, competitive product market) there will be
no scope for monitored loan contracts and the minimum collateral requirement on loan
contracts will be given by
A
T(θ)=θπ∆x − [E(xi|π) − γI] (12)




∆π = −1 (small θ, concentrated product market)




),w h e r eA(c) is deﬁned as in (6).
A central implication of this result is that, beginning from a situation where
monitoring contracts are available, as θ rises — perhaps because the product market
becomes more competitive, or because for some other reason crop liens become more
diﬃcult to enforce — informal moneylenders (those who lend primarily out of own
equity to poorer farmers) will be the ﬁrst type of lender to drop out of the market.
As θ continues to rise, intermediary monitored lending activities also become more
diﬃcult. In both cases this is because truth reporting constraint (10) binds before the
24action incentive constraint. This result would seem to explain the apparent puzzle of
trader-moneylenders dropping out of the market in Chile.
The collateral requirement A
T(θ) is obtained in an analogous fashion to the way
A(c) was derived in the last section: starting from the observation that the truth
telling constraint must bind if collateral use is to be minimized,10 substitute the
binding truth telling constraint into the investor’s break-even condition and solve
for the smallest value of A
T(θ)=−sf at which the investor can just break even.
This deﬁnes the minimum collateral requirement in (12). The optimal collateral
minimizing contract when the ex-post moral hazard problem is binding is therefore:
sf = E(xi|π) − γI − πθ∆x (13)
ss = E(xi|π) − γI +( 1− π)θ∆x
and the lender’s return following each outcome is:
Rf = γI − π(1 − θ)∆x (14)
Rs = γI +( 1− π)(1 − θ)∆x
When θ is high and crop liens are diﬃcult to establish, the post-harvest truth
reporting constraint (10) is more likely to bind before the action incentive constraint
(11) requiring that A
T(θ) be set at a relatively high level, which in turn limits how
far a monitoring strategy can be pushed to lower A(c). Monitoring can be increased
10Suppose not. Then (10) does not bind in the optimal collateral minimizing contract.
Now raise sf (lower the minimum collateral requirement) and lower ss while maintaining
E(Ri|π)=γI until constraint (10) binds exactly. Both the lender and the borrower receive
the same expected return as in the original contract, but the collateral requirement has
been lowered. This establishes the contradiction.
25no further than that allowed by A(c)=A
T(θ),s i n c ei fA(c) were pushed any further
the borrower would have an incentive to misreport. Figure 2 depicts an extreme
situation where A
T(θ) >A (0) so the problem of ex-post moral hazard is so severe
as to eliminate any scope for worthwhile monitoring activities prior to harvest. This
will be the case whenever the truth reporting constraint (10) binds before the action
incentive constraint (11) at zero monitoring, or when θ ≥
B(0)
∆x∆π. Figure 3 depicts an
intermediate situation where A
T(θ) is below A(0)and there is scope for monitoring.
To clarify the nature of the problem, iti su s e f u lt of o c u so ns i t u a t i o n sw h e r e
the problem of ex-post moral hazard always bites ﬁrst ((10) binds before (11)). The
following proposition summarizes what kind of projects a lender would ﬁnance using
only the crop harvest as collateral (i.e., without additional non-crop collateral):
Proposition 4 Assume that θ ≥
B(0)
∆x∆πso there is no scope for monitored lending.
Then,
• When θ =0 , indicating that markets are concentrated and/or for other reasons
crop liens can be enforced at zero cost, A
T(0) = γI − E(xi|π) and lenders will
be willing to ﬁnance all proﬁtable investment projects using only the expected
harvest as collateral.
• When θ =1 , indicating markets are competitive and crop liens cannot be
enforced, A
T(1) = γI − xf and lenders will only be willing to ﬁnance those
proﬁtable investment projects where the lowest veriﬁable harvest outcome xf
is large enough to cover the full value of the loan obligation γI.
It is easy to extend this proposition to intermediate cases where the problem of
ex-ante moral hazard becomes an issue for borrowers in certain asset ranges. The
main lesson is that the problem of ex-post moral hazard imposes substantial limits
on the set of feasible contracts available to address other agency problems.
26Rather than solve for the minimum collateral requirement for a loan of ﬁxed size I,
one can instead solve for the maximum variable investment amount I(θ,A) an investor
w o u l db ew i l l i n gt ol e n dt oaf a r m e rw h oh a sﬁxed collateral assets A. Proceeding
once again under the assumption that the truth reporting constraint binds before the
action incentive constraint so there is no scope for monitoring, one can arrive at the
following corollary to the above proposition:
Corollary 5 The maximum loan size that lenders are willing to provide against non-





[A − πθ∆x + E(xi|π)] (15)
In the special case where θ =0and the borrower has no non-crop collateral (A =
0), lenders are willing to oﬀer full ﬁn a n c i n gu pt ot h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo ft h e
project returns I(0,0) = 1
γE(xi|π).
When θ =1and the borrower has no non-crop collateral (A =0 )lenders will
only oﬀer credit up to the present discounted value of the lowest veriﬁable outcome,
or I(1,0) = 1
γxf.
Credit relationships will be deeper in more concentrated markets or where for
other reasons crop liens can be more easily enforced. This result is obtained by using
(12) to solve for the maximum variable investment amount an investor would be
willing to lend to a borrower with ﬁxed collateral assets A.S i n c e∆x>0, I(θ,A) is
decreasing in θ.
3.3 Extensions: ex-post monitoring and audits
Thus far the term monitoring has been used to refer to activities directed at mitigating
the problem of ex-ante moral hazard. It is evident, however, that lenders may be
27willing to pay for monitoring activities and audits that help to mitigate the problem
of ex-post moral hazard as well. Monitoring at the time of harvest would have the
eﬀect of directly lowering the value of θ that the farmer might be able to receive
from diverted produce. As suggested by the quote by di Girolamo at the start of
the paper, such practices are widespread and form an important part of the role that
ﬁeld agents for contract farming ﬁrms must play.
There is already a large literature on costly state veriﬁcation (CSV), starting
from Townsend’s (1979) article, that has examined that question in detail. In those
models, the lender is given the option of using a costly veriﬁcation audit technology
that can force the borrower to pay out the full contractually agreed upon amount
under the true state (see also Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Diamond (1984)). The
main result is that under a standard set of assumptions, the optimal contract that
minimizes veriﬁcation costs will look like a standard debt contract (SDC), with the
borrower repaying the lender a ﬁxed amount for all reported outcomes above some
threshold level, and ”defaulting,” being audited, and turning over the entire value
of the project outcomes below that threshold. Most papers in this literature assume
that that crop liens are in eﬀect completely unenforceable (θ =1 )t ob e g i nw i t h ,b u t
that they become perfectly enforced when a ﬁxed veriﬁcation or audit fee is paid. In
t h em o r er e a l i s t i cs i t u a t i o na n a l y z e dh e r e ,θ c a nl i eb e t w e e n0a n d1s ot h eo p t i m a l
contract need no longer require ﬁx e dp a y m e n t sa c r o s sr e p o r t e ds t a t e s .
284 Contingent Renewal Contracts
The worrying practice of product leakage has in recent years led to an
evolution in the contract mechanism... Some ﬁrms have established straw-
berry production contracts with sharecroppers for a ten year period. The
recovered experience indicates, however, that important product leakage
still takes place... According to the ﬁrm, important leakages still took
place in 80% of the cases. CEPAL, 1992, p. 40.
It has often been suggested that the problem of limited enforcement can be
ameliorated or made to disappear when interactions are repeated. Informal trader-
moneylenders might, for example, be able to enforce exclusive claims over a farm
borrower’s harvest by threatening the withdrawal of future lending opportunities in
the event of actual or suspected contract non-compliance.
While this view is intuitively compelling and partly correct, it can also be over-
stated easily. The argument should be examined critically, both theoretically and in
the particular circumstances of the Chilean case study. Looking at the record ﬁrst,
in recent decades the Chilean countryside has been anything but a settled place. The
entire property rights structure has been radically transformed, ﬁrst via an agrarian
reform process that created turmoil for a decade lasting through the mid seventies,
and later with the profound adjustments and reorientation in production brought
about by the country’s post-1973 liberalization and the ups and downs of the new
export economy. These events have led to both sudden breakdowns and continued
evolutionary changes in the underlying contractual structure of the economy. The
highly competitive market for intermediation services and the still very active farm
land market suggest that substantial entry and exit from the agricultural sector con-
29tinues. Taken together, these factors help to explain why the sort of informal bor-
rowing relationships established between farmers and trader-moneylenders in other
countries, which were known to Chileans in a not too distant past, may have been
less likely to become or remain established in recent years.
The theoretical argument that repeated interaction improves contract enforce-
ment also needs to be examined carefully. There is by now a large literature on
multiperiod agency relationships and sovereign debt contracting that makes clear
that, while reputational equilibria can be sustained in many circumstances, in other
situations they cannot. Many of the results concerning the value of repeated trading
relationships in the presence of moral hazard rest on strong implicit assumptions that
the lender/principal can perfectly control the borrower’s access to outside opportuni-
ties (e.g., Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989; Fellingnam and Newman, 1985; Rogerson, 1985).
These assumptions are unrealistic in a competitive lending market. The threat of
contract termination will appear fairly hollow unless the lender is able credibly to
demonstrate both that it is in her interest to carry through with the threatened cut-
oﬀ and that she has the means to impede a non-renewed borrower from replacing
the lost contract with a new relation established on similar terms with another in-
termediary. There must be costs to the borrower for switching between contracts or
relationship-speciﬁc investments and rents that the borrower may stand to lose.
However, limited liability constraints give rise to enforcement rents that might be
credibly threatened (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Dutta, Ray and Sengupta, 1989;
30Singh, 1983). The following extension of the one-period models of the previous sec-
tions demonstrates how this might allow some borrowers to lower, but not necessarily
eliminate, their collateral requirements.
4.1 Contingent renewal — Ex-post Moral Hazard case
Consider ﬁrst the problem of ex-post moral hazard in the absence of ex-ante moral
hazard, before putting the two problems together. Each period the borrower has
access to the same new investment project requiring a ﬁxed investment I.I f t h e
borrower chooses the diligent action choice π in either period, the project produces
either a success or failure project outcome for net expected return E(x|π) − γI in
that period.
Absent a strong enforcement authority, neither the borrower nor the lender can
commit to incredible promises. That is, any promises made in the ﬁrst period regard-
ing second period contract terms must be individually rational in the second period,
otherwise they will not be kept when that time arrives. This is the criterion of sub-
game perfection. Given this requirement, when a borrower enters the second and last
period with collateral assets worth A, the contract established will be simply that of
the one-shot contract examined in the last section. The borrower’s expected payoﬀ







if A ≥ AT(θ)
otherwise
The borrower’s collateral holdings will evolve over time according to his realized
returns and the loan repayments and consumption that he takes out of these returns
each period. Without much loss of generality, assume that the borrower allocates all
of his net returns at the end of the ﬁrst period to collateral buildup and consumes
only at the end of the last period, so Ai = A + si. The analysis would not change
much by allowing consumption between periods. When Ai ≥ AT(θ) the borrower is
fully ﬁnanced in the second period, but if Ai <A T(θ) no funding will be forthcoming
from any lender.
Let Rf and Rs denote the ﬁrst period current rewards to the lender, and ss =
xs −Rs and sf = xf −Rf be the corresponding returns inside the contract when the
borrower reports a project outcome xs and xf respectively. Through mis-reporting
the borrower may potentially earn additional proﬁts on the pirated produce. Let
βi ∈ [0,1] i = s,f be the probability with which the ﬁrst period lender will renew
ﬁnancing for the borrower into the second period following a reported outcome of xi
in the ﬁrst period. As will become clear, in this model the βi will be determined
completely by the choice of other terms of the contract, and are therefore primarily
for expositional purposes. The borrower’s time discount factor is assumed to be δ.
32Following a successful harvest the borrower has the choice of truthfully reporting
h i sh a r v e s to rn o t .I fh er e p o r t su n t r u t h f u l l y ,h ew i l lr e c e i v et h ep a y o ﬀ sf +θ∆x and
will be able to build collateral11 to A +sf +θ∆x. If the borrower reports truthfully,
collateral builds up to A + ss. Using the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979),
however, we can focus (without loss of generality) on contracts where the borrower
has no inducement to lie. I will therefore list only the two collateral build equations
that hold under the true reporting equilibrium outcome. Following an outcome xi in
the ﬁrst period, second period collateral holdings, denoted Ai, evolve to Ai = A+si.
The borrower’s two-period expected returns can now be calculated. When a bor-
rower starts with assets A and truthfully reports his outcome in the ﬁrst period, his
total two-period expected payoﬀ in current dollars, denoted W2(A) is given by:





The borrower’s return in each state of nature in the ﬁrst period following each
report is now made up of two components: his current rewards given by si,p l u sa
continuation value given by δW2(Ai).T h eﬁrst period truth reporting constraint that
11A lender might be able to infer from observing the borrower’s collateral position in
the next period whether the borrower reported truthfully in the previous period. This
knowledge would be of use to ﬁrst period contracting if the lender can establish a claim or
lien on property so amassed. By earlier assumption, however, such claims cannot be easily
veriﬁed or enforced, so they are of little use.
33the borrower truthfully report success can now be written as:
ss + βsδW1(As) ≥ sf + βfδW1(Af)+θ∆x (17)
The ﬁrst period contract design problem, knowing that optimal choices will be made
in the second period, involves choosing ss,s f,βs,βf to maximize (16) subject to
truth reporting constraint (17), the collateral build up equations, the ﬁrst period
limited liability constraint Ri ≤ xi + A, and the investor’s participation decision
E(Ri|π) ≥ γI.T oﬁnd a solution, manipulate the truth reporting constraint (17) to
obtain:





It is clear from this expression that the addition of another period relaxes the incentive
compatibility constraint relative to the one period case (expression (10) above) so long
as βsW1(As) > βfW1(Af).
The following restrictions apply to the contract renewal parameters βi.I ft h eﬁrst
period rewards are such that the borrower enters the second period with Af ≥ AT(θ),
then clearly any non-renewal threat (anything other than βf =1 )i nt h eﬁrst period
is hollow because the borrower could simply turn to another lender and obtain an
equivalent loan contract with his available collateral. Likewise, if the borrower enters
the second period with Af <A T(θ),t h e nβf =0is the only feasible solution, since
in the absence of an external enforcement authority a lender would walk away from
34any promise he might have made to renew because, come the second period, he can
only lose money in expected terms by continuing to contract with the borrower. By
similar reasoning βs =1if As ≥ AT(θ) and βs =0otherwise. The only possibility
for relaxing the ﬁrst period truth reporting constraint arises therefore when βs =1
and βf =0which is associated with As ≥ AT(θ) and Af <A T(θ) and therefore with
W1(As)=E(xi|π) −γI and W(Af)=0 . Using this and the by now familiar method
for deriving the collateral requirement leads to the following proposition.12
Proposition 6 In a two period model lenders will be willing to make loans of size I
to borrowers who can post ﬁrst period collateral A2T(θ) <A T(θ) where
A
2T(θ)=A
T(θ) − πδ[E(xi|π) − γI] (19)
The ﬁrst period collateral requirement is therefore reduced for certain borrowers
via the threat of losing access to the credit market.
4.2 Contingent renewal — Ex-ante Moral Hazard
It is worth noting that the amount by which the ﬁrst period collateral requirement is
reduced in (19) is independent of θ. The amount of the reduction πδ[E(xi|π) − γI]
is equal to the increase in the present discounted value of the future earnings the
12Using βs =1and βf =0and the truth reporting constraint obtain E(si|π)=sf +
πθ∆x−π1
δW(As). Substituting this expression into the investor break-even condition when
collateral use is minimized gives E(si|π)=E(xi|π)−γI which allows us to solve for A2T(θ)=
−sf which is given in the proposition below.
35borrower obtains from having access to a loan contract in the next period. In a sense
the borrower is pledging those extra expected earnings to augment his ﬁrst period
collateral holdings. This allows the lender to economize on ﬁrst period monetary
incentives that have to be provided through the contract and hence to economize on
the non-crop collateral that otherwise would have been required as ‘stick’ to make
the borrower meet the truth reporting constraint.
Had the agency problem examined been ex-ante moral hazard instead of ex-post
moral hazard, the ﬁrst period collateral requirement would have been lowered in an
analogous fashion, although the problem is slightly complicated by the the presence
of a monitoring expense. For the case where no monitoring technology is available
and the borrower’s private beneﬁt from taking a low action is B(0),i ti se a s yt os h o w
that the ﬁrst period collateral requirement on a bank loan is lowered from A(0) to
A





= A(0) − πδ[E(xi|π) − γI] (21)
where, as above βs =1and βf =0is the only solution that makes sense in a
competitive lending environment with renegotiation. If we allow for monitoring,
then the solution changes only slightly. All borrowers who choose monitoring in the
ﬁrst of two periods will use all their available collateral, or else they would have
opted for a cheaper un-monitored loan. Thus when their projects fail in the ﬁrst
36period, they are left with Af =0entering into the second period and βs =1and




∆π − (1 + δπ)[E(x|π) − γI − c]. Compared to the one-shot A(c),t h i s
function has a lower intercept and is everywhere steeper. A new absolute minimum
collateral requirement c2 is found at π
Bc(c2)
∆π = −(1+δπ).Compared to the one period
loan solution c2 < c and A(c2) ≤ A(c) — the multiperiod setting lowers monitoring
costs and expands access.
All the main insights of the one period model with both types of moral haz-
ard extend naturally to the two period model. Using the recursive formulation of
the contracting problem described above, where continuation values depend on the
stock of accumulated collateral, the analysis can easily be extended to any number
of continuation periods. A longer contracting horizon helps ameliorate, but need not
completely obviate, the need for non-crop collateral.
The dynamic evolution of this initial conﬁguration will be clearly path dependent
and can be interesting. Luck matters: two identical borrowers with the same initial
asset holdings could easily follow two entirely diﬀerent ﬁnancing paths, with one
borrower who has had a string of bad outcomes forced toward increasingly expensive
monitored ﬁnance and eventually to exit the production sector entirely for lack of
collateral (e.g., to become an agricultural laborer), while another identical but more
lucky farmer is able to graduate to less costly forms of bank ﬁnancing.
375 Traders and Moneylenders in context
In crops such as sugar beet, tobacco, tomatoes for agroindustrial purposes and fresh
fruit for export, generous credit advances covering up to one hundred percent or
more of variable production costs are frequently provided through contracts that
use interlinked terms, monitored lending and other devices that serve as collateral
substitutes. Yet in the “traditional” crops such as wheat, beans and potatoes, forward
delivery contracts are rare or entirely absent, especially for smaller farmers. The only
available private credit for these crops are heavily collateralized bank loans, loans from
the state lending bank, or whatever informal ﬁnance and self-ﬁnance these farmers
might arrange. Some crops grown under contract such as rice or barley do oﬀer tied
credit, but these lending relationships tend to be far less deep: farmers are asked
to ﬁnance a larger residual fraction of the required production costs through other
external ﬁnancing sources or via retained earnings.
Why have intermediary lenders in crops such as sugar beet been able to establish
such deep lending relationships with borrowers while in other crops these relationships
are shallow or nonexistent? And why do not product buyers who operate in crops
such as wheat and beans — which have traditionally been crops with an important
participation by small farmers — imitate the collateral substituting mechanisms that
have been used so successfully by intermediaries in these other crops to reach precisely
the farmers who are most likely to be willing to pay a premium for additional credit?
The problem is clearly not for lack of intermediaries in these other sectors. In-
38formal farm product middlemen agents and product brokers are very thick on the
ground in Chile, especially for widely produced crops such as wheat. Frequently re-
ferred to as camioneros or conchenchos 13 these traveling intermediaries can be easily
spotted traveling back country roads during the height of the harvest season, pur-
chasing produce from farmers through farm gate sales, and transporting the produce
to market.
Although these informal middlemen no longer provide credit to farmers in tradi-
tional crops, interesting intermediary structures emerge in these marketing channels.
For example, traders usually use a combination of their own capital and capital ad-
vanced from a larger product broker or ﬂour mill to whom they deliver their farm
purchases. Although farmers often complain of the supposedly crooked practices of
many middlemen (low prices, biased scales, etc.), entry into the sector is so highly
competitive that farmers can usually choose amongst several diﬀerent buyers. Many
middlemen are in fact simply small or medium and farmers who see an arbitrage op-
portunity and use their own pickup or hired truck to transport the produce to market.
Middlemen agents are often part-time farmers or the sons or relatives of farmers in
the area where they purchase farm produce.
The available historical record and personal interviews with farmers and interme-
d i a r i e si n d i c a t et h a taq u a r t e rc e n t u r ya g oi tw a sm u c hm o r ec o m m o nt oﬁnd this sort
13The term camioneros (literally “truckers”) refers to the fact that these middlemen
often travel to the farmers’ gates to purchase, weigh, and transport the produce to market
or another delivery point. I have found no publishable English expression to translate the
term conchenchos, but it is not a kind term.
39of informal trader providing credit advances to small farmers through arrangements
known as compras en verde.14 This term refers literally to the fact that the farmer’s
crop was ”purchased green,” that is, prior to harvest. Bauer (1975) and Salazar
(1985) report that during diﬀerent periods in Chilean history credit from traders to
tenants and smal farmers played a central role in the marketing of wheat and other
crops. Traders were much maligned for supposedly exploiting monopsony power and
lending at usurious interest rates. Since a large part of farm production place on
sub-tenancies in the interior of large estates, it was often the landlord himself who
acted as middleman providing credit to the farmer through an interlinked tenancy
arrangement (including sharecrops) and collecting out of the the harvest delivered to
him from all internal subtenancies and which was then sold on the market. Nisbet
(1967) reports on the lending practices of landlords and traders.
It appears then that the shake up of the agrarian reform and the rapid liber-
alization and deregulation of the economy that followed the military coup of 1973
led many of these informal intermediaries to stop oﬀering informal linked credit to
the smallest farmers, even as new tied credit instruments and larger amounts of ﬁ-
nance became available through formally established contract farming arrangements
in several of the new export and agroindustry sectors. My interpretation of why this
14Although there is a considerable literature on Chilean agrarian organization prior to the
agrarian reform period in the mid-seventies, most of this literature focuses on land tenure
and the labor relations on the large farm estates, with little reference to how credit markets
operated for tenants and small farmers. From my own interviews with farmers old enough
to remember the pre-agrarian reform period, it appears that the practice of obtaining credit
through compras en verde was fairly commonplace.
40occurred is formalized in the model described above and was amply conﬁrmed by my
conversations with farmers and intermediaries.
One practical element of the problem, not formalized above, is that many of the
purchases that middlemen make from small (and medium) farmers are transacted
informally — either with no legal record of transaction or with false invoicing — in
order to avoid paying Chile’s high 18 percent value added tax. This creates a catch-
22 situation for traders. Because traders avoid the tax they have no legal basis upon
which to rest claim against a farmer who did not repay a credit advance. If on the
other hand they worked with a legally established delivery contract, they would pay
a tax that other informal competitors on the produce market avoid.
This sort of problem is not faced by the successful contract farming ﬁrms in
the area such as the sugar beet agroindustry because they enjoy either monopsony
or oligopsony power in the market and therefore do not face as serious a pirate
sale problem. In the fresh fruit export market there is more competition amongst
buyers, but the problem has been avoided in part by dealing with larger farmers
where legal enforcement mechanisms (including non-crop collateral) are available to
dissuade opportunistic pirating behavior.
While the problem of pirate sales may seem speciﬁc to rural lending, every lender
has a story to tell of a borrower who she may have suspected untruthfully reported
a project failure or other exogenous hardship as an excuse to obtain loan forgiveness
or a rescheduling. More importantly, the absence of observed instances of strategic
41default does not at all indicate that the problem does not exist or that it does not
impose costs on the lending activity.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The problem of “pirate sales” is by no means unique to Chilean agriculture. In
a survey evaluation of several decades of experience of contract farming in Kenya,
Steven Jaﬀee underscores just how costly the problem of leakage has become in parts
of Africa:
[T]he experience of Kenyan horticulture graphically illustrates the vulner-
ability of contract farming schemes in the face of competition ... where
alternative market outlets exist, leakage of the contracted crop may be sig-
niﬁcant, particularly when the project is located in a central and easily
accessible area. When this occurs, one of the most important functions
o ft h es c h e m ee x t e n s i o ns t a ﬀ becomes the monitoring of harvests and the
policing of post-harvest crop movements. ... [S]uch crop leakage can result
in termination of a contract farming scheme. Jaﬀee (1994; p. 136).
Other mechanisms and institutions that have developed in diﬀerent parts of the
world to address this type of situation may still emerge in Chile and elsewhere. It
is not uncommon, for instance, to ﬁnd lenders even in initially fairly competitive
environments arriving at informal cartel-like arrangements to exchange information
about their borrowers and to not violate another lender’s exclusive claims to the
returns from the borrower’s projects (Bell, 1989; Fafchamps et al., 1994; Hoﬀ and
Stiglitz, 1994). Such agreements are in fact already evident in the fruit export sector
in Chile. Interviewed market participants there described how, after several initial
42years of serious pirate sales, an informal market developed amongst exporting ﬁrms
to buy and sell fresh fruit amongst themselves rather than secretly pirating each other
in the ﬁelds.
The model and examples may serve as a warning to those who might simplistically
believe that the lives of peasant farmers are always necessarily improved when market
forces or government intervention breaks up the local monopoly of moneylenders.
Increased competition in Chile did in fact chase out informal moneylenders who might
have been charging high interest rates, but in the resulting new conﬁguration without
them lending options may have become more limited for an already marginal group
of borrowers.
Still further from the rural scene, there may also perhaps be lessons for Asia in the
aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. A fashionable diagnosis of the Asian ﬁnancial
problem is that the crisis developed because of a supposed lack of competition, weak
regulation, and the permanent expectation of government bailouts. This supposedly
led to too close a relationship between banks and ﬁrms, and to collusion and corrup-
tion in the choice of investment projects and collateral guarantees. This may indeed
be true. But the policy prescription that often follows this diagnosis, that ﬁnancial
markets should become more like those in the United States and the United Kingdom
where ﬁrms rely more heavily on the bond market, may not necessarily be the most
wise.
43The potential danger is that these prescriptions call for the rather immediate re-
structuring of a complex system of contracts which had until recently heavily relied on
monitored lending. Monitored lending, which by deﬁnition requires a close involve-
m e n tb e t w e e nl e n d e ra n db o r r o w e r ,i so f t e np a r to fa ne ﬀective enforcement strategy
to ameliorate incentive problems and therefore to channel ﬁnance toward proﬁtable
ﬁrms and their projects in situations where they might otherwise have been too small,
too young, or too cash strapped to be ﬁnanced because of collateral rationing.
The analysis also suggests that a rush toward ﬁnancial market liberalization may
cause harm in unexpected places unless it is accompanied by the creation and mainte-
nance of an eﬀective legal enforcement authority or other mechanisms to allow agents
to deﬁne and enforce property rights in situations where these rights had been held
in place by local monopsony or oligopsony situations or other informal mechanisms
that are disrupted by the reforms. Only time, and further empirical research, will tell
the net eﬀect of the currently fashionable prescribed reforms.
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When markets are competitive (θ  is high) there 
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